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NTITRUST law is widely perceived to be the legal guardian of
the competitive process. To the extent that it performs its role,
the nation benefits. In the short-term, the nation benefits from a
market process which efficiently allocates society's resources in accord-
ance with consumer demand. In the long-term, the nation benefits as
more efficient producers gradually replace less efficient producers, thus
lowering the cost and increasing the supply of goods and services.
Like all law, antitrust law changes over time. Congress expected as
much: it wrote the Sherman Act in the broad and sweeping terms appro-
priate for conferring responsibility on the courts to develop antitrust stan-
dards through case-by-case adjudication.' Even when it identified
particular patterns of behavior as antitrust concerns in the Clayton Act,2
Congress left to the courts the responsibility for determining when these
behavior patterns raised the potential for an anticompetitive impact. In
the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Congress delegated to the newly
created Federal Trade Commission the task of working out, incre-
mentally, the operational meaning of the "unfair methods of competi-
tion" which Congress prohibited in that Act. 3 In the committee reports
accompanying the latter legislation, Congress was explicit about its inten-
tion to delegate this task to caselaw development by the Commission..4
Today, we have a set of antitrust laws which are enforced by two agen-
cies of the federal government: the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission. These laws are also enforced by private actions, in-
cluding private actions brought by state attorneys general. In past de-
cades, private actions frequently followed in the wake of government
actions.5 Indeed, section 5 of the Clayton Act,6 which provides that a
final judgment or decree rendered in a proceeding brought by the govern-
ment is prima facie evidence of the defendant's violation in a civil suit
brought by private parties, necessarily contemplates an initial govern-
ment action followed by a series of private actions in its wake. The model
1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 292
(1985).
2. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18, 19 (1988).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1988).
4. S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914). See discussion in William E.
Kovacic, Congress and the Federal Trade Commission, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 869, 872-73
(1989).
5. See John D. Guilfoil, Private Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Law, 10 ANTITRUST
BULL. 747, 767-72 (1965); Robert W. Stedman, Comment, Consent Decrees and the Private
Action: An Antitrust Dilemma, 53 CAL. L. REV. 627, 628 n.7 (1965). Since 1973 the number
of private actions which have been brought independently of government-instituted actions
has substantially exceeded those which piggyback on government actions. See Thomas E.
Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, Private Antitrust Cases that Follow on Government Cases, in
PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING 329, 358 (Lawrence J.
White ed., 1988).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1988).
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is the government action breaking up a major trade restraint and the in-
jured private parties benefiting from the government initiative. 7
Yet today, most antitrust suits are private actions.8 Not only are most
antitrust suits brought by private parties, but these suits are the source of
the major developments in the antitrust caselaw. The government, which
once dominated the antitrust policy agenda through its litigating activi-
ties, is in danger of losing the control over policy that it once exercised.
Moreover, a new force is arising in the antitrust policy arena: the state
attorneys general. 9 They are increasingly active, increasingly taking the
initiative, and pose the newest potential for disrupting the federal law.
This multiple-and largely private-enforcement of the federal anti-
trust laws, combined with the institutional limitations of the judiciary to
formulate antitrust policy, has created a crisis of sorts in antitrust law.
The law in the case reports can no longer be assumed to represent the
operational law. Indeed, to a large extent the caselaw is misleading. Yet
at the same time that the caselaw is losing its place as the primary source
of antitrust law, new sources of antitrust law are arising. To a large extent
these consist of various sets of guidelines issued by the Department of
Justice. Yet, the Department's guidelines offer no assurance that they
will be followed by the courts. They are not binding on private parties
and the courts have not always respected them. Furthermore, the legiti-
macy of the guidelines is routinely challenged by rival sets of guidelines
issued by the National Association of Attorneys General.
This article assesses the problematic state of antitrust law. The first
parts of the article examine the state of the current caselaw and explore
its relevant history. The article then identifies the factors contributing to
the indeterminacy and the apparent internally conflicting state of the con-
temporary law. It identifies a variety of sources of antitrust law in addi-
tion to the caselaw. Building on that background, the article then draws
conclusions about the institutional limitations of the judiciary for crafting
workable antitrust law and how those limitations can best be overcome.
II. THE PROBLEMATIC STATE OF THE
ANTITRUST CASELAW
In years past, antitrust law existed primarily in the case reports. In
accord with the generally prevailing practices of hierarchically-structured
common law jurisdictions, opinions of the United States Supreme Court
were widely accepted as the highest authority on the meaning of the law.
While the Court necessarily had to play a role commensurate with its
limited time and resources, it is fair to describe that role as formative and
7. See John E. Sarbaugh, The Government's View, 37 ANTITRusT L.J. 823, 857 (1968).
8. See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Private Antitrust Litigation: An Intro-
duction and Framework, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW
LEARNING 3, 4 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988).
9. See Thomas Greene et. al, State Antitrust Law and Enforcement, in 33d ANNUAL
ANTITRUT LAW. INST. 641 (1992).
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supervisory: the Court's opinions formed the core of the antitrust corpus,
and the lower courts attempted to align their own decisions with that
core.
Today, the caselaw is permeated with Supreme Court opinions which
are widely viewed as obsolete. Supreme Court precedents formally gov-
erning exclusive purchasing agreements and corporate mergers embrace
archaic positions which are widely recognized as no longer valid. In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court caselaw governing both horizontal and vertical
price-fixing agreements is confused and in disarray. So too is the
Supreme Court caselaw governing horizontal territorial allocations. As a
result, antitrust lawyers must turn elsewhere for guidance as to the cur-
rent state of the law.
This disarray results from more than the process of common law
growth and development. The common law grows when courts notice
that the heretofore prevailing judicial resolution of an issue is becoming
less appropriate, generally because the social or economic conditions that
formed the predicate for that judicial resolution have changed. Thus, for
example, when the courts abandoned the rule of charitable immunity,
they did so largely because the wide availability of insurance had ren-
dered the rationale for that immunity logically untenable.
The disordered state of antitrust caselaw, however, is more pervasive
and more problematic than the routinized change normally exhibited by
the common law. Rather, the antitrust caselaw displays the effects of a
mismatch between the institutional structure in which the law is formu-
lated and the substantive needs of the productive enterprise which the
law is intended to foster.
III. HOW WE GOT HERE
During most of the period prior to World War II, there were relatively
few antitrust cases. The Justice Department brought few cases, and there
were few private actions. 10 The antitrust cases reported during that pe-
riod were mostly government-instituted lawsuits. Almost all of the im-
portant decisions made their way to the Supreme Court under the
Expediting Act (which provided for direct review by the Supreme Court
of a district court decision in government-initiated antitrust litigation). 1
Although the government substantially increased its antitrust caseload
beginning in the immediate pre war period' 2 and continued that higher
level of involvement thereafter, antitrust law, until the 1960s, consisted
primarily of Supreme Court decisions which can best be thought of as
delineating (in the understanding of the day) the boundaries of behavior
consistent with a competitive marketplace and therefore of intruding very
little into routine business decisionmaking. The importance of antitrust
10. WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II, ANTITRUST POLICY AND INTEREST-GROUP POLITICS
138 (1990).
11. 32 Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1988).
12. SHUGHART, supra note 10, at 83-85.
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law during this period thus lay primarily in symbolically reaffirming the
competitive process as normative for business and commercial behavior.
The struggles over the definitions of the per se rules support this under-
standing. Thus, the Court's various positions on horizontal price fixing
and the rule of reason ranging from Trans-Missouri'3 and Joint Traffic
Ass'n 14 through Standard Oil" and American Tobacco16 to Chicago
Board of Trade17 and Trenton Potteries18 and even to Socony-Vacuum' 9 in
1940 could be easily reconciled with widely-held contemporaneous open-
textured conceptions of the competitive process. So could the Court's
various decisions involving vertical price fixing: Dr. Miles,2° Colgate,21
Schrader's,22 Beech-Nut,23 and General Electric.24
When antitrust precedent consisted primarily of Supreme Court deci-
sions in government-instituted litigation, the creation of that precedent
necessarily involved the input of the government enforcement authori-
ties-the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission-and
a check on that input by the courts, usually the Supreme Court. The
courts played their role by endorsing the government's position only
when persuaded of its plausibility and practicality and rejecting it when
unconvinced. Thus, the Court accepted a per se condemnation of hori-
zontal price-fixing agreements entered into by firms controlling three-
quarters of the market's supply of the relevant goods in Trenton Pot-
teries25 but rejected the government's arguments in Chicago Board of
Trade that the per se rule should be applied to a horizontal agreement in
circumstances in which price was subject to the daily determination of
market forces.26 The Court's check kept the antitrust condemnations
within the wide orbit of professional and business tolerance and thus fos-
tered the acceptance of antitrust law as a normative standard applicable
to industrial and commercial behavior. When antitrust cases were em-
ployed as a way of publicly confirming the nation's commitment to a
competitive marketplace, the system worked reasonably well.
Beginning in the late 1950s, this model of antitrust enforcement and
judicial decisionmaking underwent a major process of transformation.
The Court began increasingly to write antitrust opinions which were no
longer limited to describing contemporary understandings of the compet-
itive process. Instead, the Court began to write opinions which carried
13. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
14. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
15. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
16. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
17. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
18. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
19. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
20. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
21. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
22. United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
23. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 US. 441 (1922).
24. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
25. 273 U.S. at 394, 397-98.
26. 246 U.S. at 239-41.
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widespread and unsettling ramifications. It began reformulating and ex-
panding per se rules, condemning substantial amounts of behavior that
had theretofore been considered innocuous. Before the 1960s were over,
the laws governing vertical arrangements would be extensively rewritten.
During that decade the Court would issue a series of decisions creating
immense clouds of uncertainty over corporate merger-and-acquisition ac-
tivity. Antitrust law was changed from a largely symbolic endorsement of
competition as a generally self-enforcing and widely accepted behavioral
norm into a system of coercive rules whose content was increasingly ques-
tioned by large sectors of the business and academic communities.
While some of these decisions were issued in private litigation, most of
these expansionary antitrust decisions were issued in government actions
where the Court was responding to the urgings of government litigators.
In short, the responsibility for this transformation in antitrust law from
symbolic reaffirmation of a widely accepted norm to a set of coercive
rules lay not on the Court alone. Courts always rely heavily upon the
input of the parties before them. The Supreme Court had reason to give
special deference to the government's positions, because the government
possessed the institutional capacity and resources (which the Court
lacked) to develop a coherent position on antitrust issues as a whole. In-
deed, if antitrust was to develop beyond the largely symbolic role that it
had hitherto played, the government would be the institutional actor best
equipped to guide that development.
Beginning about 1974, the Court began to view the antitrust law which
it had created during the previous decade and a half as wrongly con-
ceived. The Court's rejection of government contentions in three merger
cases of that year27 and in two of the following year 28 are widely under-
stood to evidence the Court's change of position. Its decision in the GTE
Sylvania case in 197729 confirmed its new approach. In GTE Sylvania the
Court reversed the detailed control which it had assumed over the terms
of distribution arrangements during the previous decade. In a series of
decisions extending into the 1980s, the Court attempted to undo the work
that it had so enthusiastically performed in the 1960s.
The result of this reversal of course is that the antitrust caselaw corpus
which had been erected prior to 1974 has become largely obsolete. The
body of decisions which the Court has issued since that time is not com-
prehensive enough to substitute formally for the entire preexisting
27. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974); United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. Connecticut Nat'l
Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
28. United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975); United States
v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975). The latter case differs from
the others in that its rationale did not rest upon an elaboration of substantive antitrust
doctrine. Rather, it was decided against the government because there was no showing
that the merging companies were engaged in commerce as required by § 7 of the Clayton
Act.
29. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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caselaw. The Court itself has overruled only one of its prior decisions.30
Furthermore, the Court is reluctant to confess that its earlier work is in
error. As a result, precedent is misleading and large amounts of antitrust
law are indeterminate. Exacerbating this situation are other changes,
changes which have taken place in the very process by which antitrust law
had been produced in the past. These changes have made the necessary
rewriting and restructuring of antitrust law increasingly problematic.
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST
CASELAW DEVELOPMENT
It is familiar history that antitrust caselaw changed dramatically be-
tween the 1960s and the 1980s. My contention here is that the changes
which commenced in the mid-1970s had an earlier counterpart in the pe-
riod of dramatic antitrust law development which took place in the period
from the late 1950s to 1973. In this earlier period almost all areas of
antitrust caselaw underwent major change. These changes occurred as a
result of cases brought by an activist Justice Department and a coopera-
tive Supreme Court. Beginning with the Du Pont/GM31 case in 1957 and
continuing until its General Dynamics32 decision in 1974, the Court began
erecting and expanding a host of judicial impediments to corporate merg-
ers and acquisitions, impediments which exerted a discouraging effect on
mergers vastly beyond that necessary to maintain the competitive vitality
of the marketplace. This was also the period in which the Court estab-
lished a number of new and sweeping per se rules, rules which the Court
has since either abandoned entirely or drastically qualified. During the
1960s, the Supreme Court decided in favor of the government in virtually
every case that was brought before it.33 It is not apparent that the gov-
ernment's selection of cases was guided by any consistent economic the-
ory. It is even less apparent that the Court's disposition of these cases
was guided by any coherent approach whatsoever. Indeed, Justice Stew-
art, dissenting in Von's Grocery, evidenced his own bewilderment with
the haphazard structure of antitrust merger precedent which the Court
was creating: "The sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation
under § 7, the Government always wins."'
Shortly after the Court signaled its change of approach in its General
Dynamics decision of 1974, it took steps to narrow the standing of private
parties to bring antitrust lawsuits. In 1977, the year that it overruled
30. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
31. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
32. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 486.
33. Exceptions include: White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) and
Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963). The former
required that the lawfulness of distribution restraints be disposed of after trial and the
latter decided that the lawfulness of a territorial division should be examined initially by
the Civil Aeronautics Board.
34. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966).
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Schwinn, it began a substantial revision in the law governing antitrust
standing.35 As I will explain below, this revision in the law of standing
reflected and supported the substantive changes which the Court was in-
troducing. Nonetheless, as shown below, even the Court's retrenchment
and qualifications of the 1970s and 1980s fail as intelligible and predict-
able guides to the substantive law. The experience of the past thirty years
thus raises grave doubts about the Court's ability to bear the primary
responsibility for antitrust policy development. Its attempt to reshape an-
titrust law during the 1960s can best be described as a disaster, and its
attempt to recover from that disaster remains incomplete, with significant
portions of its prior caselaw remaining uncorrected and unrevised and
thus constituting misleading signals to the unwary.
A. THE COURT'S FAILED ATrEMPT TO DEVELOP
ANTI-MERGER STANDARDS
In Du Pont/GM the Court created a cloud over vertical acquisitions
undertaken by large companies. So long as one of the parties occupied a
substantial share of the product market, the other party would be vulner-
able to a charge of "foreclosing" others to that share and thus of violating
the Clayton Act. To exacerbate the unsettling effect of this decision, the
Court also indicated that all vertical acquisitions were vulnerable to con-
tinuous-and apparently perpetual-reevaluation as market conditions
changed.36 The result was that originally innocuous vertical acquisitions
could be condemned years or decades later on the ground of changed
factual environments.
Following Du Pont/GM (which was decided under the original 1914
version of the Clayton Act's corporate acquisition provision), the Court
decided an array of cases under the then current (i.e., 1950) version of
that provision. In its 1962 decision in Brown Shoe,37 the Court used an
assumed efficiency-effect of the merger as a reason for invalidating it: the
Court thought that an efficient vertically integrated enterprise would pos-
sess a cost advantage over unintegrated smaller rivals and that the preser-
vation and protection of small business was an imperative which overrode
other considerations.38 Ten years later it again manifested hostility to-
wards vertical combinations when it forced Ford Motor Company to dis-
gorge Autolite, a spark-plug manufacturer acquired by Ford in an attempt
to exploit the replacement market for spark plugs. 39
35. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
36. The Court ruled that the appropriate time for assessing the antitrust consequences
of an acquisition was at the time of suit, thereby subjecting acquisitions to perpetual vul-
nerability to Clayton Act challenge. See 353 U.S. at 589, 607.
37. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
38. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344.
39. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
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In Brown Shoe the Court applied an effective five percent market share
test to condemn the horizontal aspects of the merger at the retail level.40
Brown Shoe was written as a fact-intensive decision, so it was not imme-
diately clear that the Court would apply a market-share test to other
mergers. Moreover, the Court had asserted in its opinion that quantita-
tive tests ought not to govern the evaluation of horizontal mergers.41 The
following year in Philadelphia Bank,42 however, the Court adopted a pre-
sumption of unlawfulness for mergers resulting in a market share for the
combined companies of thirty percent or more. The 30% presumption
was then whittled down in a series of cases43 until it reached 7.5% in
Von's Grocery" and 4.49% in Pabst45 by mid-decade. By the second half
of the 1960s, horizontal mergers of any substantial size were understood
to be effectively barred by the caselaw. This stringent approach was re-
flected in the Justice Department's 1968 Merger Guidelines which
adopted an eight percent standard for mergers in "highly concentrated"
markets.4' It is generally understood that the Court abandoned this hos-
tile approach towards horizontal mergers in 1974. Its General Dynamics
decision 47 symbolizes the Court's aboutface, but does not explicitly ac-
knowledge this change in approach.
In the later 1960s, the Court attempted to formulate standards for eval-
uating the lawfulness of conglomerate mergers and acquisitions and the
formation of joint ventures.4 Once more the Court took an overly hos-
tile approach to these combinations and failed again to provide convinc-
ing rationales for its decisions. In these cases it developed a three-
pronged analysis for application to nonhorizontal mergers, which consid-
ered the merger's "entrenchment" effect, its effect on "perceived poten-
tial competition" and its effect on "actual potential competition. '49 This
potential competition analysis was thereafter employed by the Court to
invalidate the Ford/Autolite combination.50 The power of these two
types of potential competition analysis as anti-merger tools was substan-
40. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 343-44.
41. Id. at 321 n.36.
42. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
43. Mediating the transition from the Philadelphia Nat'l Bank case to the Von's Gro-
cery and Pabst cases, were United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964);
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
44. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
45. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
46. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1968 Merger Guidelines, 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
1 13,101, para. 5. The 1968 guidelines define a market as highly concentrated if the 4
largest firms account for 75% or more of that market. Under these guidelines, the govern-
ment would challenge a merger by a firm occupying 4% of such a market with another firm
occupying 4% of that market.
47. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
48. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158
(1964).
49. The three prongs of this analysis were present in Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. at
578-81. They were precisely articulated in Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 602, where
the limitations of the potential-competition analysis were revealed.
50. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
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tially reduced as a result of the Court's 1974 decisions in Marine Bancor-
poration5' and Connecticut National Bank52 in which the Court insisted
upon carrying out the logic of their underlying premises: the potential
competition doctrines apply only to concentrated markets and markets
are concentrated for a reason. If concentration is a result of market bar-
riers, then the perceived potential competition doctrine can only apply to
the extent that the external firm is perceived as able to overcome the
barriers. Similarly, the actual potential competition doctrine can apply
only when the external firm is capable in fact of overcoming the barriers.
The entrenchment effect has been silently put to rest, not by the Court,
but by general agreement.53 While the Justice Department has incorpo-
rated the potential competition doctrines in its merger guidelines, 54 the
Department has also recognized the power of potential competitors as a
check on market exploitation in circumstances making it appropriate to
uphold mergers rather than to condemn them.5 5
B. THE COURT'S FAILED ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP WORKABLE
PER SE RULES
1. Concerted Refusals to Deal
During this same period the Court was actively formulating new or
more restrictive per se rules. In its 1959 Klor's decision 56 the Court cre-
ated a broadly phrased and unqualified per se rule against concerted re-
fusals to deal. Klor's was reaffirmed in the Court's 1961 decision in
Radiant Burners.5 7 The Court failed to introduce qualifying language in
either of these cases. It was left to the bar, the academy, and the lower
courts to divine the limitations upon this sweeping prohibition for the
next twenty-five years. Only in Northwest Wholesale Stationers58 did the
Court introduce the qualifications upon the per se rule which made it a
workable guide to behavior.
51. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
52. United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
53. See Joseph P. Bauer, Government Enforcement Policy of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act: Carte Blanche for Conglomerate Mergers? 71 CAL. L. REV. 348, 369 (1983) (observing
absence of entrenchment effect in 1982 guidelines). See also 5 PHILLIP AREEDA & DON-
ALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 11 1103a, 1103b (1980); PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1 1103 (Supp. 1994) (pointing to problems with entrench-
ment as an analytical factor).
54. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1984 Merger Guidelines §§ 4.0-4.135; U.S. Dep't of Justice,
1982 Merger Guidelines IV(A).
55. U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, 1992 Merger Guidelines §§ 1.11, 1.21, 1.32, 1.321,
1.322, 3.0-3.4; U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1984 Merger Guidelines §§ 2.11, 2.21, 2.31, 3.3; U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 1982 Merger Guidelines II(A)-(C), III(B).
56. KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
57. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).





Beginning with its 1958 decision in Northern Pacific,5 9 the Court ex-
panded the scope of the Sherman Act's per se rule against tying arrange-
ments, and continued that expansion through Loew's6 ° in 1961 and
through its first Fortner decision 61 in 1969. These cases had eviscerated
the previous Sherman Act requirement that the plaintiff establish the de-
fendant's power in the tying product market.62 Now the presence of a
patent or copyright would raise a presumption of market power63 as
would the tying product's "desirability. '"64 Even the defendant's ability to
raise prices or impose other burdensome terms with respect to any appre-
ciable number of buyers65-a power possessed by any seller of a pre-
mium brand product-was apparently sufficient to invoke the per se rule
in a tying case. Having made all tying arrangements effectively illegal per
se under the Sherman Act in Fortner I, the Court started withdrawing
from that extreme position in its second opinion in that same case eight
years later.66 Even so, it was not until the Court's Jefferson Parish deci-
sion 67 in 1984 that counsel could be confident that a client with a rela-
tively small market share would not be vulnerable to a charge of illegal
tying. With a majority of the Court holding that a thirty percent market
share was insufficient to establish the market power requisite for applica-
tion of the per se rule, and with four members of the Court urging the
abolition of the per se rule governing tying, observers of the Court's work
had reason to believe that the Court was moving towards the latter posi-
tion. Indeed, Jefferson Parish confirmed the view that the standards for a
tying violation under the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act had coa-
lesced and that the establishment of a tying violation under the latter Act
had to meet the now reinvigorated standards of the Sherman Act.
Then in unpredictable fashion, the Court in Eastman Kodak68 abruptly
abandoned the insights provided by economic analysis and adopted a re-
newed hostility towards tying, this time in a way which provides a new
disincentive towards product innovation,69 a matter the Justices did not
even discuss. The tying caselaw currently is indeterminate. There are per
se rules and they do have a significant market power component, but that
market power requirement can be satisfied by the manufacturer of any
59. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
60. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
61. Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (Former 1).
62. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (requiring a
"monopolistic position in the market for the 'tying' product" as a requirement for a Sher-
man Act violation It at 608).
63. Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45 n.4.
64. Id. at 43.
65. Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at 502-05.
66. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (Fortner II).
67. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
68. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
69. See Daniel J. Gifford, The Damaging Impact of the Eastman Kodak Precedent




physically differentiated product who sells replacement parts for its prod-
uct. In that case, the per se rule applies even to the smallest company. In
short, we have a history of a continuous expansion of the per se rule
against tying to embrace virtually all tying arrangements by the end of the
1959-69 period; then we have a period of retrenchment (1977-84) in
which the market power component is reintroduced and in which the line
of development appears to point towards eventual abolition of the per se
rule. Finally, we have a new reversal in which the per se rule is applied to
virtually any seller of replacement parts for a product of its own design.
The Supreme Court's tying caselaw, in short, exhibits even more abrupt
twists and turns than caselaw in other antitrust areas and is currently un-
settled and unpredictable.
3. Nonprice vertical restrictions
The caselaw on vertical restrictions, like the caselaw in other areas, has
switched course dramatically during the last thirty years. In this area,
however, the Court has been forthright about acknowledging its change
and has articulated governing criteria which the bar and the lower courts
are able to follow. As in the other substantive areas, the Court began in
the 1960s with a sweeping hostility towards business arrangements, modi-
fying its approach in the 1970s to a more accomodating one.
In 1967 the Court's rightly infamous Schwinn decision 70 gave us a new
per se rule against territorial and customer restrictions on dealers and
distributors purchasing for resale. No satisfactory rationale for that deci-
sion was ever articulated. Schwinn was resisted by the lower courts and
condemned in the academic literature. Ten years after its issuance, it was
overruled in GTE/Sylvania.71 In GTE/Sylvania the Court recognized the
legitimacy of the academic arguments for the procompetitive effects
which can be produced by non-price vertical restraints, an acknowledge-
ment which was sufficient to bring the rule of reason into play. In subse-
quent cases, 72 the Court emphasized the self-interest of the manufacturer
or supplier in enlisting the cooperation of its dealers in expanding sales
volume, an interest which ensures that distribution arrangements are
structured to intensify competition.
4. Vertical price maintenance
The weakest points in the Court's distribution caselaw involve verti-
cally-exercised price control. Vertical price fixing has been illegal per se
since the Dr. Miles case 73 so decided in 1911. The logic of its Sylvania
decision, however, points towards radically revising or abolishing the per
70. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
71. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 36.
72. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 728 (1988); Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1984).
73. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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se rule over vertical price fixing. Yet, in Sylvania, the Court refused to
extend the rule-of-reason approach which it there adopted for vertical
nonprice restraints to the area of vertical price restraints. Eleven years
after Sylvania, the Court in Business Electronics74 provided a rationale
for holding vertical price fixing illegal per se in the limited circumstances
where vertical price-fixing arrangements could reinforce restraints im-
posed by a horizontal manufacturing cartel or a manufacturing oligop-
oly.75 In either circumstance vertical price fixing would deter cheating on
the cartel or oligopoly pricing. The logic of Business Electronics indicates
that the per se rule against vertical price fixing should be confined to
cases of cartels or oligopolies-or perhaps even replaced by the rule of
reason-but these limitations are not generally understood and the Court
has not taken any action to clarify this part of its caselaw.
C. THE COURT'S CONTRADICTORY APPROACH TO PER SE RULES
Over the years the Court has sought to justify per se rules as a short-cut
to identifying anticompetitive behavior. In 1911, the Court referred to
contracts or agreements which could be condemned out of hand because
their "nature and character" showed them to be unreasonable. 76 In re-
cent years, the Court has said that per se rules should apply only to prac-
tices which facially appear to be those "that would always or almost
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output. '77 Yet while the
Court verbally defines per se rules in this way, the Court continues to
apply per se rules to behavior which manifestly does not fit that defini-
tion: it has approved the application of a per se rule to an equipment
manufacturer's decision to supply replacement parts only to equipment
owners and to its own servicing organization; 78 it has maintained the per
se rule condemning vertical price fixing;79 and, it has done nothing to
qualify the per se rule condemning horizontal allocations of territory ar-
74. Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at 717.
75. The Court also acknowledged that vertical pricing agreements could be employed
by a retailer-cartel as a means for implementing a horizontal price-fixing agreement. In
such a case the manufacturers who entered these agreements would be pressured to do so
by the retailer cartel. Because retailer cartels having the power to pressure manufacturers
appear rare, this possibility is largely of theoretical interest.
76. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-68 (1911); United States v. Amer-
ican Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179-81 (1911).
77. Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at 723 (citing Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1988), quoting Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979); and citing NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984)).
78. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). The
Court's ruling, requiring the trial court to determine whether the service market is depen-
dent upon the equipment market, assumes the continuing validity of the per se rule and
contemplates the imposition of liability for conduct which should be deemed innocuous at
worst. See Gifford, supra note 69.
79. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990); Business
Elecs., 485 U.S. at 717.
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ticulated in Sealy80 and later reaffirmed in Topco,81 which impede small
and medium size business firms from cooperating in the promotion of a
jointly-owned brand. In a courageous tour de force by the District of
Columbia Circuit in the mid-1980s, then Judge Robert Bork was virtually
compelled to write a treatise on antitrust law to justify patently procom-
petitive conduct which appeared to conflict with two Supreme Court
precedents holding such cooperation per se illegal. 82 Bork concluded
that the Supreme Court had impliedly overruled its decisions in Sealy and
Topco and that because of this implied overruling, his court could ap-
prove a cooperative arrangement among trucking companies enabling
them to offer nationwide service. Thus the Court gives the appearance of
applying one kind of law while tolerating substantial indeterminancy at
the level of business behavior. This method of antitrust administration
creates major problems for the bar, imposes unnecessary uncertainty
upon business and creates needless decisional burdens for the over-
worked lower courts.
V. THE ORDERED CHAOS OF CONTEMPORARY
ANTITRUST LAW
A. INDETERMINANCY IN THE RULES
Although the Court signaled a shift in the law applied to distributor-
ship restrictions in GTE/Sylvania, the implementation of that shift in the
lower courts took many years. Indeed, the most dramatic result in lower
court lititgation was that terminated dealers changed their pleadings from
a reliance upon the abrogated per se rules of Schwinn to new per se con-
tentions based upon allegations that the termination took place pursuant
to a conspiracy between the manufacturer and one or more other dealers
which was "vertical in form but horizontal in effect" 83 and therefore sub-
ject to a per se rule, or that it was in some way related to an objective of
reducing price competition among dealers.84 Although most of the vari-
ous ways of claiming dealer-terminations to be per se illegal have finally
been put to rest, it has taken many years to do so and the expenditure of
millions of dollars in lawyers' fees. The Court itself was called upon in
Monsanto and in Business Electronics to curtail litigation that should
have been halted with its decision in Sylvania. Indeed, the need for the
Court to decide Business Electronics a full eleven years after it had de-
cided Sylvania reveals the clumsiness of the caselaw in reforming itself.
80. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
81. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
82. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
83. See Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 1979). The
concept of vertical in form but horizontal in impact was set forth in LAWRENCE A. SULLI-
VAN, ANTITRUST § 148 (1977). The concept was rejected in Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at
730.
84. See, e.g., Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom,
Battle v. Watson, 712 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984).
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The law governing resale price maintenance remains in a state of in-
determinancy. As previously observed, the Court has not formally over-
turned Dr. Miles, but it has done so by implication.85 The lower courts,
however, are generally unaware of any change in the law governing resale
price maintenance agreements. And, indeed, the state attorneys general
are busy bringing private actions against manufacturers and suppliers for
engaging in this behavior.8 6
There well may be political factors at work. As noted below, the Court
has effectively adopted Telser's analysis of the procompetitive effects of
vertical price maintenance. But when the Justice Department asked the
Court to overrule Dr. Miles in its amicus brief in Monsanto,87 that request
produced a storm of outrage in Congress. Professors William Eskridge
and Philip Frickey have recently analyzed the Court's work in terms of
maintaining institutional equilibria with the other governmental
branches.88 Shredding the rationale for the per se rule against resale
price agreements may not provoke substantial congressional reaction, but
explicitly overruling Dr. Miles may be perceived by the Court as unduly
threatening to its relationship with Congress. Viewing the Court's work
in this way helps to explain its behavior but, of course, does not resolve
the problems of the law's indeterminacy.
A similar indeterminacy exists in the laws governing exclusive supply
contracts, where the formally governing law is set forth in two Supreme
Court decisions which are widely regarded as obsolescent.8 9 The Court's
recently decided Eastman Kodak decision introduces vast indeterminacy
into the laws governing tying arrangements and monopolization and casts
a cloud upon product innovation. Again, various important antitrust
standards vary from circuit to circuit. The standards governing monopoli-
zation drawn from the Court's decades-old decision in Griffith,90 and fol-
lowed in the Second Circuit,91 are currently rejected in the Ninth
85. The Court has stated (1) that per se rules are limited to behavior which is always
or almost always output-reducing, and (2) that the only time that resale price maintenance
would be output reducing would be when it serves as a reinforcement mechanism for a
horizontal manufacturing cartel (or when the resale price maintenance is imposed by man-
ufacturers coerced by a horizontal dealers cartel). See Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at 723,725-
27. The combination of these two statements mandate that the per se rule of Dr. Miles be
confined to instances connected with horizontal cartels or oligopolies. This would be tanta-
mount to treating vertical price fixing as subject to an evaluation under the rule of reason.
86. Thomas Greene et al., State Antitrust Law and Enforcement, in 2 33D ANN. ANTI-
TRUST L. INST. 641, 643 (1992).
87. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19, Mon-
santo Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914).
88. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-
Foreward: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 32 (1994).
89. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). The Court's concern with the "foreclosure" effects of
exclusive supply contracts was also expressed in FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321
(1966).
90. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
91. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
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Circuit.92 Even the widely adopted Areeda/Turner predatory pricing
standards are rejected in the Eleventh Circuit. 93
The Court is gradually attempting to reduce the amount of indetermi-
nacy. Its recent decision in Spectrum Sports94 was designed to standard-
ize the law governing attempted monopolization, where the Ninth Circuit
had maintained its own idiosyncratic approach for thirty years.95 Again
in its recent Brooke Group decision, 96 the Court was trying both to seize
the initiative on predatory pricing analysis and to remove the anomalous
situation in which the lower courts were in a state of effective rebellion
against the formally governing Supreme Court precedent relating to price
discrimination with primary-fine effects under the Robinson-Patman
Act. 97
B. THE DIMINISHED LITIGATION ROLE OF GOVERNMENT AND THE
HEIGHTENED ROLE OF PRIVATE ACrIONS
Under the traditional model of antitrust law development, 98 the gov-
ernment selects cases for litigation on the basis of the policy issues which
it wants resolved. In so doing, the government shares control of policy
with the courts. The courts, acting as a check on the government, imple-
ment the policy which the government urges only when it persuades them
of its rationality and effectiveness. That model no longer applies.
Today the government is a minor actor in the litigation of antitrust
cases. It no longer controls the agenda of antitrust caselaw development.
Most cases are brought by private parties. 99 At least since the early
1970s, antitrust caselaw has been created almost entirely in private ac-
tions. Indeed, since the Court's rejections of the Justice Department po-
sitions in its decisions of 1974-75, the Department's contribution to
antitrust caselaw as a litigating party has been meager. The FTC's pres-
92. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 977 (1992).
93. McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1496 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
94. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884 (1993).
95. In Spectrum Sports the Court repudiated the version of the attempted monopoliza-
tion offense which the Ninth Circuit had developed in 1964. See Lessig v. Tidewater Oil
Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). I have previously discussed
the history of the Ninth Circuit's aberrational caselaw. See Daniel J. Gifford, The Role of
the Ninth Circuit in the Development of the Law of Attempt to Monopolize, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1021 (1986). See also Daniel J. Gifford, Predatory Pricing Analysis in the
Supreme Court, 39 ArTITsRT BULL. 431,444-47, 474-77 (1994). For a discussion on Spec-
trum Sports, see Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust.
More Objectivity Than Ever, 62 ArmRusT L.J. 327, 343-54 (1994).
96. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
97. See Gifford, Predatory Pricing Analysis in the Supreme Court, supra note 95, at
451-55.
98. See supra notes 10-30 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
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ence before the Court as a litigating party has been somewhat greater, 00
but its overall contribution to law development has been even less.
Major antitrust principles have been adopted in private litigation. The
Supreme Court caselaw on predatory pricing is a creature of private liti-
gation.' 0' The Areeda/Irner predatory pricing rule was adopted by the
lower federal courts in private litigation. 10 2 The law governing vertical
nonprice restrictions on distributors and dealers is the product of private
litigation.10 3 The related law governing vertical pricing arrangements has
largely been formulated in private litigation' °4 as has the current law of
monopolization.105 What we have in the way of law governing tying
arrangements has been developed in private litigation.' 6 The law gov-
erning concerted refusals to deal is mostly the product of private
litigation. 107
When most of the cases in which new law is made are initiated by pri-
vate parties, the issues brought before the courts will not reflect a studied
strategy of law reform. The cases arise haphazardly from the way the
interests of the litigants mix with the current state of law development.
Moreover, the presentation of policy arguments will reflect the interests
of the litigants. Arguments which reflect overall societal interests will
sometimes be downgraded for tactical litigating reasons. As a result, the
courts will be less well informed than they ought to be and will be handi-
capped in formulating the law. Moreover, the litigants themselves may
lack the expertise to articulate the national interest at all or in terms
which the courts understand. Even the skills of experienced antitrust
counsel may lie in exploiting the particulars rather than in the develop-
ment of a comprehensive vision for antitrust law as a whole.
The Supreme Court, of course, is in a better position than are the lower
courts to control its antitrust agenda. It can exercise control over its
docket to select cases for decision and in that way influence the process of
100. E.g., FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992); FTC v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990); FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
101. E.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578
(1993); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
102. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITr Continental Baking Co., 668
F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). See infra note 140.
103. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
104. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
105. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093
(1980).
106. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
107. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 289-90 (1985); NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984).
See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993) (especially Scalia writ-
ing for the Court on the meaning of "boycotts" for the antitrust insurance exemption. Id.
at 2911-17). But see FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
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antitrust caselaw reform. 108 In order to do that effectively, however, the
Court needs an overall vision as to the direction of reform and the inter-
relations among various parts of antitrust law. Without outside assist-
ance, it is extremely difficult for the Court to acquire or to maintain such
a vision and therefore to use its docket control to advance the process of
reform.
C. THE ROLE OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND STATE
ANTITRUST LAW
In addition to their role as official enforcers of state antitrust law, the
attorneys general of the several states have, as a group, become increas-
ingly active in filing federal antitrust lawsuits. In so doing, the state attor-
neys general sometimes act cooperatively, joining together as plaintiffs in
the same lawsuit. A professional association of the state attorneys gen-
eral, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), issues sets
of antitrust guidelines which over the years have interpreted federal anti-
trust law somewhat differently from the Justice Department. 1' 9 The anti-
trust agenda of the federal courts thus reflects both the haphazard
influence of privately-instituted actions and the more studied separate
agendas of the state attorneys general" 0 in addition to the input of the
Justice Department. According to one source,"' the NAAG guidelines
played a significant role in the decisions of state attorneys general to
bring suit in the Clozapine,"2 Mitsubishi,"3 Panasonic,"4 and American
Stores" 5 cases.
The state attorneys general often take policy positions different from
those of the federal enforcement authorities. State attorneys general
have commenced antitrust lawsuits which the federal enforcement au-
thorities have considered and declined to institute. Although the Justice
Department and the state attorneys general have developed working and
cooperative relationships, it remains true that state attorneys general con-
108. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L.
REv. 1093, 1102 (1987).
109. See infra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
110. As a body with a comprehensive view of how the antitrust laws should be con-
strued, NAAG has the technical capacity for offering the Supreme Court both guidance on
the selection of antitrust cases for review and advice on their disposition. NAAG thus
possesses the theoretical potential for supplanting the historic position of the Justice De-
partment as the primary source of guidance for antitrust policy development. There is,
however, no basis for believing that NAAG in fact performs this service.
111. Thomas Greene et al., supra note 86, at 643.
112. In re Clozapine Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 874 (N.D. Il. Sept. 3, 1992). See All
States Would Share in Settlement of Multistate Drug-Service Tying Case, 63 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 350 (Sept. 17, 1992).
113. Maryland v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,743 (D.
Md. Jan. 15, 1992). See also Mitsubishi Agrees to Resolve States' RPM Charges by Paying
Consumer Refunds, 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 446 (Mar. 28, 1991).
114. In re Panasonic Consumer Elecs. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
68,613 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1989).
115. See infra note 116.
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tinue to assert policy positions which differ from those asserted by the
federal authorities.
California v. American Stores Co.116 illustrates the inconsistent policies
permeating official enforcement efforts. Enforcement decisions within
the federal government are allocated to both the Department of Justice
and the FTC. These two agencies, however, have generally worked out
an allocation of effort between them, the Justice Department accepting
responsibility for certain industries and the FTC accepting that responsi-
bility for others. 117 The state attorneys general, however, constitute an-
other and sometimes inconsistent source of decisionmaking. In the cited
case, the FTC reached a settlement with American Stores on a proposed
merger. The day following the FTC's final approval of the merger on the
basis of that settlement, the state of California brought suit, 118 seeking to
enjoin the merger as a violation of federal antitrust law. California was
initially successful, obtaining a preliminary injunction against the merger.
Although the Ninth Circuit first took the view that injunctive relief was
not available in a private action, the Supreme Court ruled otherwise.
This ruling vastly expands the potential of private antitrust actions to
restructure the marketplace and diminishes pro tanto the role of the fed-
eral antitrust authorities in antitrust policymaking. This ruling also pro-
vides a major new tool to the state attorneys general as they seek to
implement competing policy agendas. In 1992 the State of Minnesota
brought suit to block a healthcare merger which had previously been
cleared by the Justice Department," 9 forcing the merger participants to
accept a consent order.120 State attorneys general are also more apt to
bring suit on vertical price-fixing charges than is the Justice
Department. 121
In addition to the different policy positions on federal antitrust law
manifested in the litigating activities of the federal enforcement agencies
on one hand and of the state attorneys general on the other, the coher-
ence and integrity of federal antitrust policy is also vulnerable to the anti-
trust legislation of the states. Most states have enacted an antitrust law,
generally on the federal model. During the period when federal antitrust
116. 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
117. See U.S./FTC Clearance Procedures, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,125. See also
Memorandum of Agreement Between U.S. Dep't of Justice and FTC (1948), described in,
4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 9565.
118. 495 U.S. at 276.
119. See Tony Carideo, Attorney General's Office Slowing Merger Proposal of Health
One, LifeSpan, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., May 19, 1992, at D2.
120. Minnesota v. Health One Corp., 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,986 (D. Minn. Aug.
17, 1992).
121. State attorneys general have been significant enforcers of the Dr. Miles rule ban-
ning vertical price agreements. See New York v. Keds Corp., 1994-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) I
70,549 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1994); Maryland v. Mitsubishi Elects. Am., Inc., 1992-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 69,743 (D. Md. Jan. 15, 1992); New York v. Nintendo of Am., 775 F. Supp.
676 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Panasonic Consumer Elecs. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 1989-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) i 68,613 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1989); In re Minolta Camera Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
668 F. Supp. 456 (D. Md. 1987).
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law was used largely to reinforce competitive-market behavior as a nor-
mative construct, state antitrust law tended to add additional reinforce-
ment. In recent years, however, the potential for conflict between federal
and state antitrust laws has increased.
The transformations of federal antitrust law have had repercussions
upon state law. Minnesota, for example, ehacted an antitrust law in 1971
which was designed largely to codify the contemporary federal antitrust
caselaw. 122 As a result, the provisions of the Minnesota law conflict to a
significant degree with the current federal antitrust caselaw which has
since undergone a radical transformation. The extent to which state anti-
trust legislation is vulnerable to federal preemption is unclear, but the
Supreme Court has signaled a wide tolerance for inconsistent state legis-
lation in cases involving procedural differences. The Court has expressed
broad acceptance of state antitrust laws permitting recoveries which
would not be available under federal law. States, for example, are free to
enact legislation granting standing under their own antitrust laws to "indi-
rect purchasers" to recover damages for overcharges by their ultimate
supplier resulting from monopolistic or cartel-like behavior,123 even
though indirect purchasers have been denied standing under federal anti-
trust law for reasons of federal antitrust policy. 124 Moreover, defendants
can be subjected to liability to indirect purchasers in antitrust counts
under state law that are joined with antitrust counts under federal law
and are pursued in federal court actions to which both direct and indirect
purchasers are parties. 25
Federal and state antitrust laws potentially diverge on noncompensa-
tory damages. Federal antitrust law specifies that actual damages will be
trebled. 126 When the issue arose, however, as to whether punitive dam-
ages in unlimited amounts can be assessed under state law for antitrust
offenses, the Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. 127 Punitive
damages can be assessed in antitrust actions brought in federal court in
which counts under both federal and state law are joined. Certainly the
Court's recent remedial decisions enhance the status and power of state
antitrust laws. They suggest (but as yet inconclusively) that state law may
redefine restrictively the areas of substantive behavior which are permit-
ted to business entities under the federal law.
122. MINN. STAT. §§ 325D.49-325D.66 (1994).
123. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
124. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
125. Arc Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 99, 103-05.
126. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
127. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
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VI. THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF ANTITRUST LAW
A. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDELINES, POLICY STATEMENTS
AND BUSINESS REVIEW LETrERS
Today the primacy of the antitrust caselaw is in jeopardy. Lawyers in-
creasingly look to the Department of Justice Guidelines for authority.
The Department has issued guidelines and policy statements governing
corporate mergers and acquisitions, 128 international operations, 129 the li-
censing of intellectual property, 130 and structures for medical practice. 131
These various guidelines represent attempts by the Department to seize
the initiative in policy development. Without the guidelines, antitrust law
would be the creature of judicial decisions, most of which would be ren-
dered in private lawsuits where the Department would have limited input
at best.
The Department's first guidelines were the 1968 Merger Guidelines,
issued to codify a decade of expanding prohibitions. These guidelines,
however, became obsolete (as did the Supreme Court decisions on which
they were largely predicated) during the 1970s. In 1982, the Justice De-
partment issued a thoroughly reformulated set of merger guidelines.
These merger guidelines were thereafter reissued in revised form in 1984,
and in 1992 a third revision of the guidelines governing horizontal merg-
ers was issued. The Department issued guidelines governing vertical re-
straints in 1985132 which were partially modeled upon the merger
guidelines. These were, however, the subject of significant controversy
and were revoked in 1993. Department guides for international opera-
tions were originally issued in 1977 and have subsequently been
superceded, modified, and revised. 133 Policy statements on health care'3
and guidelines on intellectual property licensing 135 are the most recently
issued codifications of enforcement policy.
128. U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines; U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 1984 Merger Guidelines; U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1982 Merger Guidelines; U.S. Dep't
of Justice, 1968 Merger Guidelines.
129. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Opera-
tions (1995); U.S. Dep't of Justice, International Operations Guidelines (1988); U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations (1977). See also U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy (Apr. 9, 1992).
130. U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property (Apr. 6, 1995).
131. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statements of Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles
Relating to Health Care and Antitrust (1994); U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, Antitrust En-
forcement Policy Statements in the Health Care Area (Sept. 15, 1993).
132. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Guidelines for Vertical Restraints (1985).
133. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Opera-
tions (1995); U.S. Dep't of Justice, International Operations Guidelines (1988); U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations (1977). See also U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy (Apr. 9, 1992).
134. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statements of Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles
Relating to Health Care and Antitrust (1994).




Because the guidelines embody a comprehensive approach to a sub-
stantive area of antitrust law, they carry persuasive power which particu-
lar enforcement policy positions lack. Indeed, the persuasive power of
the guidelines tends to exceed that of most reasoned judicial decisions
just because the judicial format is not well adapted to generalized policy
analysis.
The Department's business review letters are another source of anti-
trust law. Their role, however, is a complex one. Viewed narrowly, busi-
ness review letters merely set forth the government's position on the
lawfulness of a transaction. While they effectively bind the government,
they do not foreclose a suit by a private party. From this perspective,
they are as likely as not to be rendered obsolete by a judicial decision in
an action brought by a private party. Viewed more broadly, however, the
business review letters are guidelines in incubation. The Department,
through the process of issuing business review letters, is creating the intel-
lectual and experiential base for formulating guidelines and policy state-
ments. This was the path for the health care policy statements.
B. THE NAAG GUIDELINES
As noted above, the state attorneys general, through NAAG, have also
issued antitrust guidelines. Indeed, there are competing NAAG guide-
lines for both the now-defunct vertical restraints guidelines of the De-
partment of Justice and for the Department's horizontal merger
guidelines. These NAAG guidelines are not guidelines for enforcing state
antitrust laws, they are guidelines keyed to federal law. The existence of
the NAAG guidelines tells us something of the significance of antitrust
guidelines generally. The NAAG guidelines recognize the power of anti-
trust guidelines as comprehensive statements of antitrust policy to influ-
ence court decisions. The NAAG guidelines, therefore, constitute
attempts by the state attorneys general to seize the initiative from the
Justice Department and to influence the judiciary with a competing set of
antitrust policies, thus injecting more fluidity and uncertainty to the cur-
rent state of the law.
The NAAG guidelines originated in the 1980s when the state attorneys
general viewed the 1985 Justice Department's vertical restraints guide-
lines as too tolerant. NAAG therefore "corrected" the tolerance of the
federal government by issuing its own competing set of vertical restraints
guidelines in 1985.136 These were thereafter revised in 1988 and 1995.
NAAG also issued its own set of horizontal merger guidelines in 1987137
and revised them in 1993.138 Although the NAAG guidelines began as a
reaction to the policies incorporated in the Department of Justice guide-
lines, the revocation of the vertical restraints guidelines by the Depart-
ment of Justice in 1993 was not followed by a similar NAAG repeal.
136. NAAG, 1985 Vertical Restraint Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,400.
137. NAAG, 1987 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,405.
138. NAAG, 1993 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,406.
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Instead, NAAG has just issued a revised and updated set of vertical re-
straints guidelines. 139 The Department's medical guidelines and its intel-
lectual property guidelines have not yet produced a NAAG response.
C. FEDERAL SUBSTANTIVE CASELAW
The federal antitrust caselaw is a principal source of antitrust law. It is
the traditional place where the law is made. In a formal sense, it is the
source of all nonstatutory antitrust law and it continues, in a practical
sense, to perform a critical role in the disposition of cases. Yet because of
the radical transformations of federal antitrust caselaw, the federal
caselaw is not always a good guide to the actual state of that law. As
previously noted, federal antitrust caselaw is in a state of partial disarray.
Many Supreme Court decisions are left standing as formally governing
precedents which are widely understood to be obsolescent and no longer
effective. Yet the Court has not repudiated them. Thus, they stand as
false beacons for the unsophisticated and as traps for the unwary. In
many areas the Court has lost the initiative to the Department of Justice
and its guidelines program. In some areas the Court has attempted to
regain the initiative in the development of antitrust law, yet the judicial
process is not well adapted to perform the comprehensive revision which
is required. As developed more fully below, judicial decisions which sig-
nal the Court's acceptance of sets of comprehensive analyses developed
from extra-judicial sources work reasonably well. But attempts by the
Court to develop law incrementally have been disastrous.
Lower court caselaw is in better shape than Supreme Court caselaw,
but it suffers from a lack of guidance from above. Perhaps the most dra-
matic example of the Supreme Court's failure to guide lower courts lay
in the primary-line injury cases under the Robinson-Patman Act. For al-
most two decades the lower courts were ignoring the Supreme Court's
formally governing precedent, choosing instead to follow the Areeda-Tur-
ner predatory-pricing analysis despite its conflict with Supreme Court
precedent. 140 Taking note of this phenomenon a few years ago, Judge
Easterbrook reluctantly suggested that the Seventh Circuit perform its
formal duty to follow Supreme Court precedent, however ill-informed
might be that precedent, until the Court changed it. 14 1 Although the
Supreme Court finally removed this particular embarrassment by effec-
tively overruling its obsolescent Utah Pie decision' 42 in its recent Brooke
Group decision, 4 3 other examples of lack of guidance are not hard to
find.
139. NAAG, 1995 Vertical Restraints Guidelines (Mar. 27, 1995).
140. See Gifford, Predatory Pricing Analysis in the Supreme Court, supra note 95, at
451-53.
141. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1404-06 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990).
142. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
143. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
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The Court waited almost thirty years to straighten out the dangerously
expansionary distortions that the Ninth Circuit had introduced into the
law of attempted monopolization. 144 In the merger area the Court has
similarly failed to exert effective guidance. The Justice Department's
guidelines have effectively been substituted for the formally governing
Supreme Court precedents as a source to which counsel look for the ef-
fective law. Exclusive supply contracts-an area close to the hotly dis-
puted trade issues connected with the Japanese vertical keiretsu
relationships145-constitute another antitrust domain in which the for-
mally governing Supreme Court precedents are obsolete 146 and the lower
courts must look elsewhere for guidance.
D. FEDERAL STANDING CASELAW
The close relationship between limitations on the standing of private
plaintiffs and the deficiencies of the substantive caselaw is rarely, if ever,
acknowledged by the Court. Nonetheless, the relationship is a critical
one, because the former offset the consequences of the latter to a signifi-
cant extent. Indeed, much of the current standing law developed coinci-
dentally with the transformation in the content of the substantive
antitrust caselaw which began in the mid-1970s. The "antitrust injury"
gloss put on the Clayton Act's section 4147 originated in the Court's 1977
decision in Brunswick 48 and the current formulation of the "direct in-
jury" requirement derives from Illinois Brick149 decided that same year.
When standing is denied to private parties to complain of antitrust vio-
lations, the initiative necessarily reverts to the government. Deficiencies
in the substance of antitrust law can be tolerated when no one raises
them. Some of the deficiencies in current antitrust law are widely recog-
nized. The danger is not that the government will exploit these deficien-
cies but that private parties stimulated by potential treble-damage
recoveries will do so. The law governing vertically imposed price ceilings
is widely recognized as an area where the law needs to be reformed. Ver-
tical price fixing has been treated as per se illegal behavior, even when
the price fixing consists of ceilings imposed by manufacturers or suppliers
on the resale prices of distributors. 150 Most observers do not believe that
the latter conduct is anticompetitive. Yet despite the Court's rhetoric
that per se condemnation should be limited to conduct which always or
almost always produces anticompetitive consequences and a reduction of
144. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884 (1993) (the Court
repudiated an expansionary approach to the attempted monopolization offense which the
Ninth Circuit had created in 1964); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
145. See Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust and Trade Issues: Similarities, Differences, and Re-
lationships, DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 1995).
146. See text accompanying supra note 89.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
148. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
149. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
150. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
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output,151 the law continues to condemn vertical price fixing, including
the imposition of price ceilings on distributors by their suppliers.
The Court has so far been able to continue its traditional condemnation
of such price ceilings while not having to face observable consequences
traceable to its own judicial intransigence. It has done this with an imagi-
native use of standing doctrine. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum
Co.' 52 illustrates this scenario. In that case the plaintiff was a gasoline
retailer competing with independent stations franchised by Atlantic Rich-
field. The plaintiff's complaint was based upon Atlantic Richfield's im-
position of ceiling prices upon its franchised dealers, an imposition which
forced the plaintiff to meet lower prices than would otherwise be the case.
The Court was able to turn aside the plaintiff's challenge without re-
forming the substantive law by holding that the plaintiff's asserted injury
(i.e., having to meet the low price levels of the defendant's dealers) was
not the kind of injury that the antitrust laws are designed to remedy. This
result follows directly from the analysis which the Court first formulated
in Brunswick. 53 Now competitors cannot challenge vertically-imposed
price ceilings. Presumably the government would not challenge such pro-
competitive arrangements. Thus, the Court is freed from reforming this
aspect of antitrust caselaw.
Merger law is another area where obsolete substantive caselaw is res-
cued by standing doctrine. The caselaw is something of an embarrass-
ment, because, as noted above, 154 the formally governing Supreme Court
merger precedents are obsolete. Again, however, the ramifications of
this dysfunctional caselaw are avoided: almost no one other than the gov-
ernment can complain that a horizontal merger violates the Clayton Act's
section 7.155 Hence, the obsolete standards of the caselaw can remain on
the books. The Justice Department's merger guidelines have become
more than a statement of enforcement criteria. As the only likely plain-
tiff, the Department's enforcement criteria have become the effective
law.
E. THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE
Perhaps more than in most areas of the law, antitrust law is particularly
dependent upon extra-legal sources, especially the academic literature.
The law governing predatory pricing, for example, is based upon a semi-
nal 1975 law review article by two Harvard Law School professors.
156
Their proposal-which has come to be known as the Areeda-Turner
test-treats pricing below marginal cost (or under average-variable cost
151. See supra Part IV.C.
152. 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
153. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 477.
154. See supra Part IV.C; supra note 47 and accompanying text.
155. 15 U.S.C § 18 (1988). See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104
(1986).
156. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975).
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which serves as a surrogate for marginal cost) as presumptively predatory
and pricing at or above marginal cost (or its average-variable-cost surro-
gate) as presumptively nonpredatory. With minor modifications from
their original proposal, most of the federal circuits have adopted the
Areeda-Turner approach to the evaluation of predatory pricing.157
The law governing vertical restraints was shaped to a substantial extent
in the writings of Richard Posner. In his books and articles, Posner set
out in detail the analysis which he believed should be applied to vertical
restraints.158 Posner constructed a proposed legal approach to vertical
restraints which was heavily grounded in economic analysis. Recognizing
that manufacturers and suppliers possessed economic incentives to enlist
the cooperation of their dealers in expanding sales, Posner pointed out
that vertical restrictions must generally be geared to increasing sales, a
procompetitive objective. Even when the manufacturer possessed a mo-
nopoly, the manufacturer's incentive would lie in capturing all of the mo-
nopoly profits for itself (rather than sharing them with its dealers). Thus
even a monopolist manufacturer would be unlikely to employ dealer re-
strictions as a form of restricting market output.
When the Court decided GTE/Sylvania, it basically adopted the analy-
sis provided in the Posner articles. As a result, the Court knew the
ramifications of its decision. It was able to recast the antitrust treatment
of vertical restraints comprehensively by adopting a broad approach al-
ready worked out in the literature.
A seminal article on vertical price restraints published in 1960 analyzes
the economics of vertical price maintenance. 159 That article, written by
Lester Telser, concludes that resale price maintenance is a technique em-
ployed by manufacturers to evoke promotional behavior by dealers,
thereby expanding the sales volume of the manufacturer's brand. He also
points out that resale price maintenance could be employed by members
of a manufacturers' cartel to impede efforts of any member to cheat on
157. Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 845 F.2d 404, 407 (2d Cir. 1988),
aff'd, 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 725 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729
F.2d 1050, 1060 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Chillicothe Sand & Gravel
Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427,431 (7th Cir. 1980); Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d
1355, 1360 (8th Cir. 1989); Marsann Co. v. Brammall, Inc., 788 F.2d 611, 616 (9th Cir.
1986); Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639, 649 (10th
Cir. 1987). See also Barr Lab., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 978 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1992).
158. Judge Posner's most influential analysis of vertical restraints was contained in a
1975 law review article: Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An
Analysis of Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975). He also discussed these matters both before and after the
GTE/Sylvania decision. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 10.3(4th ed. 1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTTRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 147-
67 (1976); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distri-
bution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Rea-
son and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1
(1977).




the cartel's price or output restrictions. Telser's analysis would support
the application of a rule of reason to resale price maintenance agree-
ments or limiting the per se rule to the situation of a manufacturers' car-
tel or oligopoly. Telser also recognizes the theoretical potential of a
retailer cartel to coerce manufacturers into formally imposing resale
prices on the retailers as a cover for an underlying horizontal agreement
among the retailers. Since most retail markets are highly competitive,
this use of resale price agreements is of academic interest only. 160
Although the antitrust laws have traditionally treated resale price mainte-
nance as per se illegal, the law has been gradually moving in the direction
indicated by Telser. The Court's 1988 opinion in Business Electronics vir-
tually adopts the Telser analysis.16'
The law governing tying arrangements is heavily indebted to the pio-
neering work of Ward Bowman in the 1950s162 and generally to economic
analysis. 163 Bowman argued that the "leverage" theory upon which tying
law was constructed was flawed. Economic analysis generally teaches
that tying is a useful means for price discrimination and can be employed
for "metering" purposes, i.e., to charge customers amounts correspond-
ing with the intensity of their uses of the product purchased. Frequently a
seller employing a tying policy would be expanding output and therefore
lessening the resource distortion which lies at the base of antitrust
prohibitions. Whether or not a particular instance of tying produces an
expansion of output over what would otherwise occur is dependent upon
the facts of the particular case. To conform to the Supreme Court man-
date that per se rules be limited to circumstances which always or almost
always produce anticompetitive effects, the per se rule governing tying
arrangements would have to be abolished. It is probably fair to predict
that the existing caselaw cannot withstand indefinitely the pressure ex-
erted by the combined effect of the Court's articulation of the limits of
per se rules and the academic literature.
The efficiency aspects of exclusive supply contracts have been recog-
nized in new ways since the publication in 1975 of an influential book on
vertical relations by Oliver Williamson. 164 Williamson pointed out, inter
alia, that since purchases of supplies on the market were generally an
alternative to in-house production or long-term supply arrangements, the
use of one of the latter arrangements indicates that the purchaser be-
lieved this arrangement was less costly than the alternatives: in other
160. Id.
161. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725-27 (1988).
162. Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE
L.J. 19 (1957).
163. See, e.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 52-58 (1983).
164. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES; ANALYSIS AND ANTI-
TRUST IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975).
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words, that it was more efficient.165 In this case (as in many others), the
interest of the purchaser in minimizing its costs coincides with the public
interest in allocating resources efficiently. Recently, the business commu-
nity has come to appreciate the cost-effectiveness of the Japanese vertical
keiretsu relationships. 166 These arrangements are essentially long-term
relationships between a final product producer and its input suppliers.
Their success demonstrates empirically the theoretical insights articulated
by Williamson. The antitrust caselaw has not yet fully caught up with the
pertinent economic analysis but it surely will.
VII. INSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE COURTS TO
FORMULATE ANTITRUST LAW
At their core, courts are institutions for resolving disputes. Their pro-
cedures are designed to arrive at fair and accurate resolutions of the facts
in particular cases and to apply governing legal standards to those facts.
In common-law jurisdictions, courts bear the additional responsibility of
creating legal doctrine through the precedential effects of their decisions.
Nonetheless, the strength of judicial decision making lies in the focus of
those proceedings upon the particulars of each case.
Although courts are charged with the responsibility of creating prece-
dent, they are only partially equipped to perform that task. Courts are
best equipped to articulate broad moral principles underlying human re-
lationships. The Supreme Court has performed this task well when it has
issued constitutional pronouncements recognizing the equality of the
races 167 and adopting the one-person one-vote principle.' 68 Courts enun-
ciating such important values nonetheless are often required subse-
quently to become mired in the particulars of implementing the broad
principle. Even so, what courts lose in the appeal of the broad moral
stance, they offset with their competence in dealing with particulars. For
the most part, the Supreme Court has been able to stand aloof from the
messy problems of implementation, retaining its prestige as the nation's
normative institution of last resort. Even when it is called upon to work
out difficult accommodations between competing and widely-held values
(as it has in dealing with the outer limits of free expression' 69 and in the
arena of church/state interaction), 170 the Court is particularly equipped to
perform such tasks in the incremental mode of the common-law tradition.
Yet courts become less competent when circumstances force them to
legislate broadly over a complex body of behavior with the facts of the
165. The classic formulation of this insight is Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
4 ECONOMICA N.S. 386 (1937). Williamson provided a comprehensive analytical explora-
tion of its ramifications. Williamson, supra note 164.
166. See Kevin Kelly et al., Learning from Japan, Bus. WK. Jan. 27, 1992, at 52.
167. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
168. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
169. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
170. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Board of Educ. of
Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
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particular case as their only guide. The facts of a particular case may
provide support for the articulation of an open-textured principle which
guides (but does not control) future decisions. This is what the Court did
in the segregation and reapportionment cases. But in other areas this
approach does not quite work. In the business arena, judicial decisions
frequently carry immediate ramifications for planned behavior, not only
because business firms often avoid conduct which is problematic under
existing law, but also because principles or approaches stated in economic
language often imply precise applications. Thus, there are some areas of
behavior for which workable rules require intensive and longitudinal
study and analysis. I argue below that antitrust is one such area.
VIII. SUCCESSFUL ANTITRUST POLICY DEVELOPMENT
Antitrust policy was largely unproblematic during its first fifty years
because the caselaw could be understood as a judicial effort to foster and
to reinforce a norm of competitive-market behavior. The basic compo-
nents of such a norm were widely understood to consist of avoiding car-
tel-like activity: business firms should not agree on price with their rivals
nor should they attempt to corner the market on goods. There were, of
course, other rules which in hindsight might be questionable but which
could be generally accepted as falling within the imprecisely defined con-
cept of a free and open market: no vertical price-fixing agreements 171 and
no tying unpatented goods to patented products. 172 The success of the
caselaw lay in the largely norm-reinforcing role which was performed by
judicial antitrust decisions.
Antitrust policy became problematic in the 1960s when the Court
switched from a role of reinforcing a preexisting normative construct into
the role of formulating new norms which exceeded the expectations of
the professional and business communities. Antitrust law became a set of
rules which were imposed coercively rather than a self-enforcing set of
generally accepted norms. As previously pointed out, the Court did not
171. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Although
resale price-fixing agreements were illegal per se under Dr. Miles, suppliers could effec-
tively control final prices in consignment arrangements. United States v. General Elec. Co.,
272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926). Suppliers could also control final prices by refusing to resupply
dealers who sold below the level suggested by the suppliers. United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
172. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,608 (1953) (indi-
cating that patents would confer the market power requisite for a tying violation under the
Sherman Act). The tying of unpatented goods to patented products, however, has had a
problematic history. The Court determined that the patent law did not authorize a paten-
tee to impose such a tie as a condition of a patent license in 1917. Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Such tying was later determined to be
patent misuse. Carbice Corp. of Am. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
When the Court later expansively interpreted the patent misuse doctrine in the Mercoid
cases, Congress reacted by explicitly permitting tying arrangements as a means of exploit-
ing a patent. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp.
v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944). Under present law, paten-
tees have broad permission to employ tying arrangements. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
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adopt this new policy without outside help. The government encouraged
the expansionist tendencies of the Court majority. Indeed, the govern-
ment continued the push for an expansionary antitrust caselaw well be-
yond the time that the Court itself had concluded that its expansionary
decisions had been in error.
The government's role in this expansionary period is troublesome. The
government possessed the resources and capabilities for developing a co-
herent and comprehensive antitrust policy. The Court had understood
that the government's role over regulatory affairs generally-and includ-
ing antitrust in particular-was to develop comprehensive policy posi-
tions which could then inform judicial decision making. It is possible that
much of the Court's deference to the government during the 1960s rested
upon the Court's belief that the government had assessed the larger
ramifications of the legal positions which it was asserting before the
Court.
In retrospect, it appears that the Antitrust Division was just performing
the role of an aggressive litigator. It asked for as much relief as it thought
the Court would give it. Instead of exercising a responsibility to develop
a comprehensive view of wise antitrust policy, the Division left to the
Court the responsibility for drawing limits. The result was that no limits
were drawn and antitrust policy became irrational.
Antitrust observers understand that from 1974 through the 1980s the
Court took an approach towards antitrust policy which differed dramati-
cally from its approach of the preceding decade and one-half. The newer
approach-often identified with the so-called "Chicago School"-was
heavily dependent upon economic analysis and the academic literature.
This approach, which the Court reached on its own during the 1970s, was
reinforced substantially by the Justice Department after 1981.173 In re-
viewing the Court's work during this period, there is much more to see
than the Court's change in substantive outlook. The process itself, as an
exercise in lawmaking, deserves careful examination.
First, if the Court was to reverse course on antitrust policy, it needed
external guidance. The Court is not well-equipped to develop a compre-
hensive regulatory (or deregulatory) strategy. Under traditional theory,
it could have looked to the government for help. The government, how-
ever, did not provide that help until the Broadcast Music174 case at the
end of the decade. It is reasonably clear that the Court relied upon the
academic literature during the mid- and late-1970s as a decisional aid.
173. There is no political message here. The 1981 Justice Department was part of the
Reagan administration which had assumed office that year. But Justice Department inputs
into antitrust policy, taking the form of comprehensive assessments (in the form of guide-
lines or policy statements) of a large area of antitrust concern, have continued through the
Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations. Indeed, Anne Bingaman, President Clinton's
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, has been particularly active in issuing such
assessments.
174. Broadcast Music Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). In that case Deputy Solicitor
General Frank Easterbrook argued for the United States as amicus curiae, urging reversal
of the decision below holding blanket licensing by copyright societies per se illegal.
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Indeed, because the academic literature (especially in the writings of
then-Professor Richard Posner) had worked out the consequences of
nonprice vertical distribution restraints, the Court was able to decide the
Sylvania case with confidence. In subsequent cases involving predatory
pricing, evidentiary rules in antitrust law, supplier/dealer interaction and
the very purposes of antitrust law, it has relied extensively upon the aca-
demic literature, especially as evidenced in the writings of Richard Posner
and Robert Bork. During this period the lower courts had dramatically
rewritten the law applicable to predatory pricing by similarly drawing
from academic literature. In this case, it was the AreedafTurner article
on predatory pricing175 which provided the needed guidance to these
courts.
Second, the criteria which the Court was adopting for evaluating anti-
trust cases was largely signaled, rather than fully articulated. The Court's
decision in General Dynamics does not explicitly adopt any new criteria
which cannot be found in its earlier decisions. Formally, the Court
merely ruled that the presumptive effect of statistical evidence can be
overcome by a showing that the statistics are misleading. 176 Connecticut
Bank (which is rarely cited as symbolizing the Court's change-of-course)
does repudiate the suggestion in Pabst177 that the government has no re-
sponsibility for establishing a relevant market. 78 But reestablishing the
relevant market as a part of the government's case would not itself entail
a revision of the prior caselaw. Marine Bancorporation undermines the
facile approaches embodied in the Court's earlier conglomerate merger
decisions but on the basis of an economic analysis which had been im-
plicit in the prior cases. All that the Court did in these cases was to apply
accepted analytical approaches in an even-handed manner.
Even the later Sylvania case does not articulate an elaborate economic
theory. Yet most observers of the Court's work knew Sylvania's ramifica-
tions. They knew that from the academic literature from which the Court
drew. Similarly, antitrust observers knew that when the lower courts
adopted the Areeda/Turner marginal-cost/average-variable-cost test for
predatory pricing, they could look to the academic literature for limita-
tions upon the use of that test and for its larger ramifications. Thus, when
the Supreme Court and the lower courts drew from the academic litera-
ture for guidance in the shaping of antitrust policy, they also pointed ob-
servers to that same literature as a source of help. In short, the "law," in
the Holmesian sense of a prediction of how the courts would decide
cases,179 would not be found entirely in the case reports. Indeed, in the
circumstances of the mid-1970s the case reports were even more mislead-
ing than they are today. Instead, the effective law was signaled in the
175. See supra note 156.
176. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497-98 (1974).
177. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549 (1966).
178. United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 669-70 (1974).
179. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
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recent case reports, and necessary elaborations were to be found in the
academic literature.
The role of the academic literature as a source of antitrust law is quite
dramatically illustrated in the government-instituted Professional Engi-
neers case,180 where the Court accepted the position that only factors af-
fecting the operation of marketplace competition are relevant to antitrust
analysis. This position had been argued in the academic literature' 8' and
had just been forcefully urged by Robert Bork in his then-recently pub-
lished Antitrust Paradox.8 2 The Justice Department at this time, how-
ever, had not yet reached that position. Indeed, the Department even
conceded in its brief that a professional association could legitimately
adopt ethical rules which, because of their anticompetitive consequences,
would be illegal for other associations. 183 The Court thus reached its
newly articulated conception of the rule of reason without government
assistance but with substantial reliance upon the academic literature.
Third, beginning in 1982 the Justice Department undertook the task of
issuing comprehensive sets of guidelines covering large areas of antitrust
subject matter. Starting with mergers in 1982, the guidelines presented a
comprehensive view of a number of antitrust issues. They showed how
the resolution of a particular case involving one set of facts would imply
dispositions of other cases involving different facts, when the cases were
evaluated under a common framework. In providing these comprehen-
sive frameworks, the Department had at last begun to perform the work
which the older legal theory had assigned to the government but which
the government had hitherto failed to perform, at least in the antitrust
area. Moreover, the 1982 guidelines evidenced analytical strength, unu-
sual for any government enforcement agency. They resolved one of the
conundrums of prior antitrust analysis. In their evaluation of horizontal
mergers, the guidelines combined in one conceptual framework the de-
termination of a relevant market, ease of entry and the concept of market
power.1s4 The merger guidelines were slightly revised and reissued in
1984. That part of the merger guidelines which pertained to horizontal
180. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
181. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); Oliver E. Williamson,
Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
Posner had urged that "the economic theory of monopoly provides the only suitable basis
for antitrust policy" and "an appropriate guide in interpreting our actual antitrust laws."
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRuST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8 (1976). The exclu-
sive concern of the antitrust laws with economic competition was the thesis of Bork's book
which had been published shortly before the Court's decision and was cited in Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion. 435 U.S. at 700 n.*. Justice Stevens majority opinion,
however, did not cite that work, but instead cited an older work by the same author for
that point. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
182. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978).
183. Brief for the United States at 47 n.39, National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (No. 76-1767).
184. See Steven C. Salop, Symposium on Mergers and Antitrust, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall
1987, at 3; Lawrence J. White, Antitrust and Merger Policy: A Review and Critique, J.
ECON. PERSP., Fall 1987, at 13, 14-15.
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mergers was further revised and reissued in 1992. The basic approach
adopted in 1982, however, has continued in force.
The guidelines thus perform several functions which the Court by itself
could not accomplish. They adopt a comprehensive analysis of an area of
antitrust concern such as mergers, and provide a policy approach which is
consistent throughout. This kind of approach provides an intellectual
base which is beyond the capacity of the judiciary. Antitrust observers
trying to understand the guidelines are not required to seek out the aca-
demic literature in the way that they were effectively required to do in
order to fully comprehend the Court's antitrust opinions like Sylvania,
Monsanto, or Business Electronics. In contrast to those Court opinions,
the guidelines contain both a comprehensive set of standards and the the-
ory upon which those standards are based. Again, the guidelines provide
assurance to the concerned public that each decision is not only logically
supportable on its own facts but also that the decision is based upon the
same evaluative framework as is the decision of other cases. Finally, the
guidelines provide a superior basis for predicting future decisions than is
generally provided by caselaw. Over time the analytical strengths of the
guidelines are carrying the day. The courts are showing increasing re-
spect for the guidelines as evaluative standards, often using them as sup-
port in their own decisions. 185
Fourth, the Court ultimately began to receive the litigation assistance
that it needed from the Department of Justice. The amicus brief submit-
ted by the government in Broadcast Music was influential not only in
persuading the Court about the merits of that case but, as well, in influ-
encing the way the Court conceptualized anticompetitive behavior gener-
ally.186 In Broadcast Music the Court began to focus upon whether
challenged business behavior was the kind that would be likely to lead to
a restriction of output,187 a focus which might seem an obvious one for a
law whose avowed purpose was the furtherance of competition but a fo-
cus which theretofore had not figured prominently in the caselaw. In
Broadcast Music the Court's focus on output reduction occurred in the
185. See, e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1440 (9th Cir.
1995); Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1299-1302 (9th Cir. 1993); FTC v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1502-03 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Although in both Olin and PPG the court
stated that the guidelines were not binding upon it, both courts employed an analysis which
was derived at least in part from the guidelines. 986 F.2d at 1300; 798 F.2d at 1503 n.4.
186. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15, Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (No. 77-1578). That Brief pointed
out that normally a cartel raises prices and decreases output, diverting resources away from
their most productive use and reducing the efficiency of the market. It then argued that
the effects in the Broadcast Music case were critically different because the copyright socie-
ties brought about a reduction of licensing costs.
187. In Broadcast Music the Court indicated that in determining whether conduct
should be condemned under a per se rule, the inquiry should be into "whether the practice
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition
and decrease output, and in what portion of the market, or instead one designed to 'in-
crease economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.' " 441
U.S. at 19-20. As pointed out in the text, the concern with a decrease in output was later
explicitly applied to rule-of-reason analysis.
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context of deciding whether behavior was subject to the per se rule.
Later that focus would be extended.
In its 1984 decision in the NCAA case the Court restated the rule of
reason in terms which again focused upon whether the conduct before it
was likely to reduce output. Its restatement was assisted by the govern-
ment's amicus brief. The traditional formulation of the rule of reason is
that of Justice Brandeis in the Chicago Board of Trade case.188 The
trouble with Brandeis's version of the rule of reason, however, is that it
does not say very much except that it is necessary to inquire into all of the
facts. In its amicus brief the government argued that the elaborate in-
quiry called for by Brandeis would often be unnecessary if the focus were
upon whether a challenged arrangement would be likely to reduce out-
put. The government referred to this kind of inquiry as a "truncated"
rule-of-reason analysis. 189 The NCAA version of the rule of reason suc-
cinctly connects the rule with the substantive concerns of the law. Under
the NCAA version a restraint fails the rule of reason if it results in a
lessening of output below that which would occur in a competitive mar-
ket. This is a sophisticated result, one for which the basis was laid in
Broadcast Music and for which the government provided analytical and
persuasive assistance in its amicus brief at the time of its adoption. 190
During the 1980s the Department frequently submitted amicus briefs
to the Supreme Court in antitrust cases on the Court's docket. In submit-
ting these amicus briefs, the Department was basing its approach on a
studied and comprehensive approach to antitrust policy, the kind of ap-
proach which the older legal theory had wrongly assumed the Depart-
ment had followed in the pre-1981 era. Indeed, the Department
submitted amicus briefs in important lower-court antitrust cases as well.
For example, in Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co.191 the Department urged
the court to employ economic analysis of seller-distributor relations ap-
plicable to the case of a monopoly seller.192 Although at first rejecting
the Department's position, the court ultimately accepted it.
The Court's recent decision in the Eastman Kodak case reveals the
downside of the Court's dependency upon input from the Justice Depart-
ment. In that case the Department submitted an amicus brief supporting
the position of the Kodak Company. 93 When the majority declined to
follow the Department's recommendations, it adopted a position which
many observers consider naYve. Because the decision of the majority was
not premised upon a broad and coherent view of antitrust law into which
188. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
189. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 3, 7,
NCAA, 468 U.S. at 85 (No. 83-271).
190. Id.
191. 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872 (1984).
192. See 727 F.2d at 701 & n.8.
193. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Eastman Ko-
dak Co. v. Image Technical Services Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (No. 90-1029).
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the Eastman Kodak decision could be placed, the Court is bound to
flounder when it tries to work out the ramifications of that decision.
The Department, of course, makes mistakes. In the Court's 1993 term
the Department urged the Court to deny certiorari in the Spectrum Sports
case, a case which the Court did accept and in which it overruled a long-
standing and festering Ninth Circuit precedent. Steve Calkins suggests
that the government apparently was unconcerned about the Ninth Cir-
cuit's aberrational attempt-to-monopolize rule,194 a strange position for a
Department which should be concerned with fostering an antitrust policy
conducive to national well-being.
The conclusion is that the optimum antitrust policy requires the coordi-
nated work of the Justice Department and the Supreme Court. The
Court will often be persuaded by the Department. Indeed, the more
studied is the Department's position and the more it appears to be part of
a comprehensive approach, the more the Court is likely to be persuaded.
The Department can provide a depth and breadth of analysis which is
unavailable to the Court acting alone. But just because the Department
has immense potential influence upon the Court, the Department itself
bears a heavy responsibility to ensure that its positions are comprehen-
sively developed. When the Department fulfills that responsibility and
when the Court performs the role for which it is best equipped-chal-
lenging the Department to provide this studied and comprehensive in-
put-the Court's antitrust decisions are most likely to command lasting
respect.
IX. CONCLUSION
Antitrust law has grown from the largely symbolic role which it played
during its early years into a potent force with which business firms must
reckon in their daily affairs. It has undergone at least two major periods
of transformation. The first period, from 1957 to 1973, created an anti-
trust law which imposed substantial inefficiencies upon American busi-
ness firms. During the second period, beginning in 1974, most of the
changes introduced during the 1957-73 period were undone, although at
significant cost to the business firms who were parties to cases litigated
during this second period. Today, antitrust law is drawn from a complex
set of materials, of which the caselaw itself is only a part. The Justice
Department's guidelines have played a major role in the second transfor-
mation of antitrust law, as have newly developed limitations on standing
and the academic literature. The state attorneys general and private liti-
gants forcefully provide policy input, not all of which is consistent with
the national interest in a fully efficient marketplace. Successful antitrust
policy over a long term requires the courts to be resistant to those de-
mands which do not conform to this efficiency goal. Yet to do so, they
194. Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Ob-jectivity Than Ever, 62 ANTrrRUsT L.J. 327, 344 & n.113 (1994).
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need a coherent vision of antitrust law as a whole and to relate individual
claims to this larger vision. Institutional limitations handicap courts in
developing this broad perspective. The Justice Department's input can
assist the courts to overcome their limitations, but it involves both a chal-
lenge and the acceptance of a responsibility vastly beyond the litigating
role which the Department played during the period of the 1957-73 trans-
formation. The courts too need to recognize their own institutional
limitations.
